On December 4, President Trump released his 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), laying out an “America First” blueprint for U.S. foreign policy. At just over 30 pages, the document is notably brief and marks a departure from decades of emphasis on multilateralism.
Instead of broad-based engagement, the strategy adopts a narrower definition of U.S. national interest, prioritizing economic leverage and more tightly bounded commitments. At its core, it recalibrates how, where and why the United States engages abroad — with direct implications for alliances, including its relationship with the United Nations.
Here are key takeaways.
1. Narrower View of U.S. Interests
The NSS argues the U.S. should concern itself with other countries only when their actions “directly threaten U.S. interests.” Strategy is framed almost exclusively around sovereignty, border control, economic power and military dominance. International institutions are portrayed as “sovereignty-sapping” and sometimes “anti-American,” with explicit warnings against “globalism” and open-ended global governance.
2. Western Hemisphere Takes Priority
More than any previous NSS, the document recenters U.S. strategy on the Western Hemisphere – a modern “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Migration, narcotics trafficking and foreign influence “closer to home” drive calls to reallocate resources toward the region, including expanded maritime operations and security cooperation across Latin America and the Caribbean.
At the UN, this could translate into more selective engagement with bodies tied to migration, counternarcotics and maritime security, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
3. “Economic Security Is National Security”
The strategy makes little distinction between economic policy and national security, asserting plainly that “economic security is national security.” Reindustrialization, supply chains, critical minerals, energy dominance and capital flows are treated as tools of strategic power. At the UN, agencies able to demonstrate clear links to economic stability or supply-chain resilience may find more traction than those centered on broader governance agendas.
4. Alliances on Transactional Terms
Alliances remain part of U.S. strategy, though the NSS presses allies – particularly in Europe – to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, endorsing a benchmark of five percent of GDP for NATO partners. That logic is likely to extend into UN debates on peacekeeping, with heightened pressure on costs, mandates and effectiveness.
5. Soft Power Is Recast, Not Gone
Foreign aid and soft power are not eliminated, but sharply reframed. The strategy criticizes the so-called “foreign aid complex,” prioritizing investment over assistance and pragmatic cooperation over democracy promotion, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. It signals support for political and economic reforms only when they emerge organically within countries themselves, rather than through external pressure.
What This Means for Multilateralism
Though much of the NSS may sit uneasily alongside broader multilateral ideals, this is nevertheless an opportunity for the UN to remind Americans of its value in interest-based terms: how UN sanctions disrupt illicit finance, how peacekeeping contains instability, how counterterrorism and non-proliferation efforts protect U.S. borders and markets, how early action on disease averts costlier interventions later and how refugee assistance reduces migration pressures at the U.S. border.
The same applies to essential technical agencies like the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Meteorological Organization and the World Health Organization. They don’t undermine sovereignty – they protect it. Shared standards keep Americans safe while preventing chaos or rival powers from setting the rules. The real choice isn’t cooperation or independence; it’s cooperation or ceding control.
In a strategy defined by self-interest, the UN’s relevance may seem to narrow. In fact, it will become couched less in terms of norm-setting and more about crisis management — brokering ceasefires, preventing escalation and absorbing diplomatic friction so the U.S. doesn’t have to deploy troops.
In this environment, immediate outcomes will matter more than long-term agendas — a reality that will shape how multilateral partners navigate the years ahead.
